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AbstrAct The transition from socialism to capitalism has led to diverging 
socioeconomic outcomes for the Post-Communist countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE). While common social problems of capitalist societies were 
virtually unknown prior to the collapse of socialism, they have been on the increase 
since the introduction of comprehensive market-oriented reforms. The objective 
of our article is to investigate the impact of the rising inequality in income in 
CEE and the effects of distinct trajectories on the change of individual orientations 
toward social inequality in Post-Communist East Europe. We present statistical 
data on structural changes and apply linear and logistic regression on data from 
the ISSP survey 2009 on the perception of social inequality. Our findings suggest 
that both individual and structural conditions are relevant for attitudes related to 
inequality. First, objective inequality itself is not associated with individually 
perceived income differences. Second, different Post-Communist welfare regimes 
indicate an effect on such perceptions as well as on the individuals’ assessment of 
the society they live in. Further, the socioeconomic position affects the attitudes 
toward a redistribution policy.
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INTRODUCTION
The countries of the macro-region widely known as Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) share a common recent history. For several decades of the 
former century they were governed as state-socialist regimes and represented 
the ideological, political and economic antagonist of the Western capitalist 
world. The economies of the socialist-led states were centrally planned and 
the institution of private ownership was for the most part absent (Bandelj & 
Mahutga, 2010: 2136). Among the achievements of this system were strong 
industrial development and economic growth (particularly in those countries 
which were least developed before 1917 and 1945, respectively), an educational 
upgrading of the whole population, full employment and a comprehensive 
welfare system (Lane, 1971). The adverse features included a retardation 
of productivity, a slow-down of the increase in the population’s living 
standard compared with Western Europe3, and an increasing gap between the 
population at large and the new ruling class, the Nomenclatura (Djilas, 1957; 
Voslenski, 1984). State socialism in East Europe collapsed between 1989 
and 1991 and with its abolishment new independent nations emerged on the 
political map. The newborn states rapidly established democratic institutions 
as well as an economic system based on private property and free markets. In 
this process they faced major challenges, having to cope simultaneously with 
differentiation and polarization within a considerably short time span (Lane, 
1992; Mikhalev, 2003; Verwiebe & Wegener, 2000). After a difficult period 
of transition, however, they are now on a remarkable path of growth and the 
socio-economic situation and opportunities have been improved considerably. 
The reflections that guide the reasoning of this paper are as follows: During 
the last two decades, the Post-Socialist countries have been transforming 
toward capitalist market economies and as part of this transformation have 
also been adapting their systems of social protection. It is evident that 
the transition process has varied for each country, and thus some of them 
have achieved a more successful transformation and today are better off 
economically than others. An important concomitant of this process was 
that some of these countries have managed to join the European Union and 
the NATO, while others have formed the Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) (Aidukaite, 2010: 9). However, there was also another crucial 
consequence of the transition: Levels of social inequality have been rising 
dramatically in some of the CEE countries. Starting from these facts, the 
3  The GDP of Czechoslovakia, for instance, fell from the level of neighbouring Austria in the late 
1940s below that of Greece or Portugal in the 1980s.
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goal of our article is to analyze the impact of the transformation process on 
orientations and perceptions toward social inequality in these countries. 
This article makes use of recent data from the module Social Inequality 2009 
of the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP), which included twelve 
East European Post-Socialist countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Poland, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine and 
East Germany. The next sections present the theoretical framework and the 
hypotheses. We then describe the ISSP dataset, variables and methods of 
analysis and present our empirical findings. The final section concludes with 
a discussion of the results and their implications.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Central and Eastern European countries can be grouped by various 
socioeconomic features and indicators. For example, one can classify them 
by their GNP per capita, as demonstrated by Jolanta Aidukaite (2010: 10; see 
also Haller, 1990). She points out that the majority of the Post-Communist 
states are characterized through their comparatively low level of income, 
while a small group of them is better off. Regarding the ISSP-participant 
countries, Ukraine has a (comparatively) low level of income (or GNP per 
capita), while Bulgaria, Latvia, and Russia have relatively low incomes; 
Croatia, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary have a rather 
high income, and Slovenia and East Germany have a high income. Table 1 
provides general socioeconomic data (population figures, GDP per capita, life 
expectancy in years), distinguishing between CEE countries with lower and 
higher incomes on the basis of the aforementioned reasoning. 
The presented figures correspond by and large to the countries’ geographical 
position: Countries closer to Western Europe have higher incomes, people 
live longer and population development is more stable in comparison with 
countries further to the East. Such a classification clearly shows considerable 
variation at the macro level. GDP per capita has increased in most countries, 
but only weakly in Russia while in the Ukraine it has even decreased. Similar 
figures appear concerning life expectancy which also increased everywhere 
except Russia and the Ukraine. The differences in this regard between the CEE 
countries are huge: Male life expectancy was 63,1 years in Russia in 2010, but 
76,3 – 13 years more – in Slovenia. However, even East Germany (the former 
German Democratic Republic), which experienced the strongest increase in 
GDP per capita due to massive support from Western Germany, does not fare 
well in one important indicator: The population has dropped massively from 
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16,3 Million to 12,8 Million people due to a reduction in fertility rates and 
emigration. Our paper addresses the effect of macro structures on the micro 
level. The general theoretical proposition is specified as follows: 
The process of transition from communism to capitalism in the CEE 
countries has been taking place on a political, a socioeconomic and a 
sociocultural level. While the political transformation spawned new political 
institutions, the socioeconomic transition has led to new emerging forms of 
social inequality and the ideological transition has engendered new values 
regarding social justice. These developments have affected the orientation of 
the population toward social inequality.
Figure 1 illustrates the proposition as a three-level and tripartite temporal 
structure and indicates the causal relationships between each phase.
Figure 1 General theoretical background proposition
In Europe, the period between 1989 and 1991 was characterized by the 
“vertiginous decline of communism that culminated in the liberation of 
Eastern Europe and the break-up of the Soviet Union” (Gros & Steinherr, 
2004: 33). Simultaneously, with the gaining of independence of the CEE 
countries and the establishment of new nations, the road for economic 
reforms was paved by policy makers in order to launch the transformation 
toward market economies. An evaluation of the transition process requires 
an examination of the question whether the following characteristic features 
of command economies were successfully abolished: 1. A preference for 
industry, particularly heavy industry, and a neglect of the service sector; 2. a 
high level of investment rates for physical and human capital; 3. the absence 
of an extended financial sector which allocates savings to investment as well 
as the virtual absence of interest rates; and 4. the absence of an institutional 
and legal framework that characterizes a market economy (Gros & Steinherr, 
2004: 117). 
In the literature, the transforming CEE countries are basically divided 
into three categories, i.e. East Germany, CEE countries outside the Former 
Soviet Union (FSU), and the successor countries of the FSU. East Germany 
32
Figure 1: Gener  oretical background pro ositi n 
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fully merged with West Germany in a short time span.4 Countries of the 
second class, most of which are rather small, received much support from 
the European Union (EU) in order to converge their economies toward the 
Western market model. The third group of countries suffered from political 
chaos in the aftermath of communism. Even though each group was facing 
a different starting point, the common feature of all the countries was the 
need for a profound transformation and reform program. A successful reform 
plan had to take into account existing political and economic circumstances; 
a plan that could be performed successfully say in Poland or Hungary was 
not necessarily a useful strategy for the Ukraine or Russia (Gros & Steinherr, 
2004: 60-1). Thus the economic reform aims as well as the resulting outcomes 
varied considerably between the countries. Changing a command economy 
into a market economy requires price reforms, privatization, financial market 
reforms, fiscal reforms and changes in the legal framework. Ideally, “all the 
reforms, or preparations for them, must be launched quickly, even if they 
take a decade to implement” (Gros & Steinherr, 2004: 105). However, from 
the beginning the transition was accompanied by a heated debate over the 
speed and process of economic reforms around the two opposing approaches 
of “gradualism” and “shock therapy” as modes of transformation (Ivanova, 
2007). Supporters of the gradualist approach claimed that economic 
growth could only be achieved with a full-scale program of an adequately 
coordinated and sequenced macroeconomic reform. Advocates of shock 
therapy believed that an instant economic liberalization in an economy 
without pre-existing markets was a sufficient condition for the immediate 
emergence of new markets that would meet every demand (Ivanova, 2007: 
169). A clearer understanding of the modes of transition can be achieved 
with the construction of types of transformation, i.e. the characteristic path of 
socioeconomic development that a CEE country had to take. Three such types 
can be distinguished: Stable transformation (e.g. Czech Republic, Hungary), 
unstable transformation (e.g. Bulgaria, Russia), radical transformation and 
inclusion into a ready-made state (e.g. East Germany) (Verwiebe & Wegener, 
2000: 126). In order to meet the new emerging needs of the population, the 
4  East Germany’s transformation was entirely piloted by West Germany, and included the 
adoption of its institutions, political and technical expertise as well as the instant implementation 
of the encompassing social safety net. Its industrial enterprises were integrated into the 
world economy overnight (or closed down if highly unprofitable). In this way the basis of 
competitiveness was destroyed by a dramatic monetary revaluation of 300 % over the course of 
the monetary union of East and West Germany. 40 % of the previously existing jobs vanished, 
industrial production dropped, and unemployment increased dramatically (see also Verwiebe 
& Wegener, 2000: 132).
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phase of economic rebuilding also required adaptations of the social safety 
net, or to put it another way, the establishment of capitalist welfare states. 
In the former Communist countries, problems like poverty or 
unemployment were considered irrelevant because they were regarded as 
“solved”. Nevertheless, social problems were present and they had adverse 
effects on particular social groups while, on the other side, a Nomenclatura 
as an upper class with special privileges did exist (Aidukaite, 2010; see also 
Djilas, 1957; Voslenski, 1984). Social security was organized primarily 
through employment because everybody was obliged to work. Housing costs, 
food and transportation were more or less free; social policies encompassed 
full employment, free education, and free social services and healthcare. 
Social security operated as a huge redistributive mechanism that promoted 
equality between the large social classes and groups. However, after the 
collapse the shift from a command economy to a market economy challenged 
its basic pillar, the state’s dedication to full employment. In summary, 
it was not sustainable under the new economic conditions, which led to a 
massive social restructuring and a decline in the standards of living for many 
people. Despite the successful performance of the economy, particularly 
in the emerging private sector, poverty, income inequality, decreasing real 
incomes, unemployment and high mortality became manifest social problems 
(Aidukaite, 2010: 8; Arts & Gijsberts, 1998: 146-7; Verwiebe & Wegener, 
2000: 127; see also Adam, 1999). Ivanova (2007) claims that social inequality 
in many CEE countries increased due to a combination of economic and 
social policies, which were in favor of the market-led model of transition that 
ultimately, however, failed to generate a “trickle-down effect” of economic 
growth (Ivanova, 2007: 197). Others argue that what actually happened in 
the first few years of transformation was plainly the neglect of social policy, 
since it was not considered to be an actual priority. Social protection was 
undertaken with an ad hoc approach, but eventually since the mid-1990s 
many governments in CEE spawned welfare reforms in order to meet long-
term budgetary and socio-demographic challenges (Sengoku, 2004: 232). 
Social reforms in CEE during the transition can be summarized as follows: 
First, a withdrawal of the state from many activities and services was striven 
for. Several subsidies and the provision of many public goods and services 
were either abolished or suspended. Many health-care and social-care 
services were privatized and activities of voluntary and non-governmental 
organizations were encouraged by the state. Second, the welfare systems were 
institutionally pluralized, for example by the separation of social security 
funds from the state budget, or by the provision of social security by a number 
of independent institutions. At the same time, the powers and responsibilities 
10 FELIX RIEDL–MAX HALLER
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of regional and local governments were extended (Sengoku, 2004: 232-3). 
The European Union, the World Bank and the IMF have had a considerable 
impact on these reforms (Clasen, 2012: 400; Ivanova, 2007: 167, 169). 
However, these welfare reforms did not match adequately the emerging new 
social problems. Even though their overall effects have been positive for 
the social structure of CEE societies, several large social groups were faced 
with a significant deterioration of their life circumstances. They included 
individuals with a low-level of education and members of ethnic minorities 
(e.g. Roma people) who frequently were excluded from the labour market, 
as well as retired and aged persons whose pensions did not keep pace with 
rising prices so that their standard of living deteriorated considerably. On the 
other hand, there were also “winners” of the transformation, particularly the 
young and healthy citizens with higher levels of education and social capital. 
Furthermore, regional inequality rose dramatically due to the concentration 
of wealth and better-paid jobs in urban and more western areas. Being a 
rural inhabitant in CEE literally became a risk of social exclusion during the 
last two decades (see also Aidukaite, 2010: 16; Bandelj & Mahutga, 2010: 
2138-40). Nevertheless, social policy experts agree that despite the problems 
associated with the reforms, public welfare provision in CEE performs better 
today than one might expect. Labelling the newly-emerging welfare states 
merely as “residual” might be inappropriate (Aidukaite, 2010: 20; Sengoku, 
2004: 234). Similarly, the assumption that these countries constitute one 
distinct welfare regime has been challenged (Leibrecht et al., 2011).
The CEE countries differ significantly in socioeconomic terms, and the same 
holds true for the developing systems of their public welfare provision (Fenger, 
2007: 13). Therefore, one could explore whether the countries constitute 
distinct welfare regimes including qualitatively different arrangements 
between the state, the market, and the family (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Even 
though his approach was focused on Western countries, Esping-Andersen’s 
typology has been used ever since as a core idea for comparative research 
on the welfare state. It is thus useful to analyze whether the Post-Socialist 
countries can be assigned to genuine welfare regimes that are distinguishable 
from each other, as suggested by Fenger (2007). Following this idea, we 
propose that three different welfare regime types exist in East Central Europe 
today, including the following countries from our data set:
1.  Post-Communist former Soviet states: Russia, the Baltic states (Latvia, 
Estonia), Ukraine;
2.  Post-Communist East European states: Poland, the Czech and the Slovak 
Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Croatia, Bulgaria;
3.  Post-Communist German state: East Germany (“Neue Bundesländer”).
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In general, the reasons for the distinction between the first and second 
group are that state socialism was in existence for around seventy years in 
the first group, but only about half a century in the latter. Further, the level 
of development in the second group was higher. This was also true for the 
German Democratic Republic, which, in addition, experienced a unique 
process of transition, as outlined before. Most importantly, however, are the 
insights from the discussion on the development of these countries as welfare 
states. Scholars in this field view social policy in CEE as a multidimensional 
phenomenon that is affected by a variety of specific forces in regard to the 
socio-economic conditions, characteristics of social security institutions, the 
impact of globalization and Europeanization, and the composition and impact 
of political elites (Aidukaite, 2011). In general, four groups of scholars can be 
identified in this regard: The first group asserted that a common Post-Socialist 
welfare model does not exist, but that the CEE countries developed toward 
a liberal welfare state. The second group argues that due to institutional 
differences and varying social and economic performance comparison with 
established West European welfare state typologies is problematic. The third 
group addresses the emerging differences among the new (CEE) member 
states of the EU in order to develop a modification of existing welfare-
state typologies. The fourth group argues that aside from some differences, 
the CEE countries share considerable historical, institutional, and socio-
economic characteristics. Therefore, it is justifiable to speak of distinctive 
Post-Socialist welfare regimes (Aidukaite, 2011: 216-7). On the basis of a 
cluster analysis that included indicators of governmental programs (e.g. public 
expenditure on health, education, the ratio of physicians to inhabitants, levels 
of individual and corporate taxes, wage level for public servants) and also 
social situation variables (e.g. GDP growth, life expectancy, unemployment, 
infant mortality, inflation), Fenger (2007) argues that CEE countries can be 
grouped into three distinct types of welfare regimes: the Former-USSR type, 
the Post-Communist European type and the Developing welfare states type. 
In comparison of these three types, the Post-Communist European countries 
have the highest revenues from social contributions, the highest government 
expenditure for health and the highest spending on social protection as well 
as the lowest level of inflation (Fenger, 2007: 18-9, 23-5). It is important to 
point out that our own typology largely corresponds with Fenger’s (2007), but 
the properties of our research design necessitate a substantial adaptation: We 
substitute the Developing welfare states type - which consists, for instance, 
of Moldova and Georgia - with East Germany as a type on its own for the 
following reasons. First, its situation is exceptional among the CEE countries 
and second, our data set does not include countries of the developing type.
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In the preceding section we discussed the dramatic socioeconomic upheaval 
in CEE during the last two decades. The new public institutions had to 
tackle the social problems and challenges in terms of new patterns of social 
inequality. It can be assumed that social perceptions of the conflicting models 
of transformation and confusing developments have had a crucial impact 
on the population’s attitudes toward equality and social justice. Due to the 
dramatic effects of the transition, the transformation and transition process in 
CEE has also raised the attention of inequality research (see also Verwiebe & 
Wegener, 2000; Örkény & Székelyi, 2000). As a result of diverging structural 
conditions, the different CEE societies are characterized by different forms 
of inequality, and also by diverging models and methods for the justification, 
surveillance, and stabilization of inequality (see also Haller et al., 1995: 
259). This is mainly achieved by an ideology of social (in)equality and 
justice. Such an ideology serves at least three purposes: The legitimation of 
the privileged position of the better off; the provision of a legitimation for 
the worse off so that they accept their disadvantaged position and adapt to 
their living conditions; a critique and delegitimation of the existing order of 
distribution (Hradil, 2002: 223). The main theoretical strands which address 
the general phenomenon of the justification or delegitimation of inequality 
are (neo-)functionalist consensus theory and (neo-)marxist and non-Marxist 
conflict theory. The first claims that a society needs an accordance of beliefs 
and values in order to function without problems. Conflict theory, however, 
assumes that individual interests, perceptions and evaluations vary across 
society because individuals are situated in different positions within the social 
structure, which makes a consensus in values and beliefs highly unlikely (see 
also Verwiebe & Wegener, 2000: 124; Haller et al., 1995: 222-3).
In order to overcome the seemingly theoretical contradictions between 
these two approaches we assume that two value systems exist in this regard: 
Primary values based on culture and secondary values based on the location 
of individuals in socio-structural positions. Most members of a society 
share primary values because they are grounded in the common cultural 
heritage and, we may add, in the dominant political system. These values 
are passed on in the course of socialization. Secondary values differ from 
one social class and population group to the next, since different groups 
hold different social-structural positions and thus have diverging interests, 
perceptions and value orientations (Verwiebe & Wegener, 2000: 124-
5). Which patterns of inequality ideologies are likely to be found in the 
beliefs of a contemporary East European society? We may distinguish here 
three different types of orientations: People’s attitudes can be egalitarian, 
functionalist, or meritocratic. Egalitarian views advocate substantive equality 
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and redistribution, whereas functionalists strongly oppose this idea and thus 
are anti-egalitarian. Functionalists are also characterized by an emphasis 
on positive effects of social inequality and a belief in achievement as the 
basis of unequal rewards. The meritocratic position favors a social order 
that guarantees the appreciation of high quality work, a good education and 
equality of opportunity (Haller et al., 1995). We assume that meritocracy is 
of minor relevance in Post-Socialist societies while functionalism - as the 
dominant ideology of a market-driven capitalist society - and egalitarianism - 
as the dominant ideology of former communism - are the prevalent ideologies.
HYPOTHESES
A comparison of Gini coefficients suggests diverging patterns of change of 
income distribution across the Post-Communist countries. Figure 2 and Table 
2 show the progression of Gini-index values for CEE countries between 1986 
and 2009. They clearly indicate that income inequality has increased in many 
of them during this period. Moreover, there is also considerable variation of 
income inequality between the CEE countries. The trajectories correspond 
largely to our typology proposed above: The increase of income inequality 
was modest in most Central East European countries which have been EU 
member states since 2004 (Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia); it was marked more in Bulgaria and the Post-Soviet 
countries, irrespective of whether EU member states or not (Latvia, Ukraine, 
but rather moderate in Estonia). Further, income inequality increased most 
strongly or, better speaking, exploded, in Russia.
It can be assumed that these strongly-diverging patterns of changes in 
economic inequality are reflected in subjective perceptions at the individual 
level. This leads to the first hypothesis:
14 FELIX RIEDL–MAX HALLER
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HYPOTHESIS 1: The individual perceptions that differences in income 
are too large will be higher in countries with high and increasing economic 
inequality and comparatively lower in countries with moderate or low 
inequality.
The economic transition has led to diverging outcomes for each CEE country. 
In the course of these developments, the transforming states also reconstituted 
their fiscal and administrative systems of public welfare provision, which 
in turn resulted in distinct types of welfare regimes. The Post-Communist 
European states have a higher level of public expenditure on health and 
social protection, a higher level of revenues from social contributions and 
lower inflation levels than the former Soviet Union countries. The same 
holds true for East Germany, as it is part of the Federal German Republic 
that is labelled as a “conservative” welfare state in the literature (Fenger, 
2007: 23; see also Esping-Andersen, 1990). In our analysis, we establish East 
Germany as a distinct type. We assume that the mentioned characteristics of 
welfare spending and provision are indicative of a welfare state’s ability to 
redistribute income and target the needs of the population. Accordingly, our 
second hypothesis reads as follows:
HYPOTHESIS 2: Residents of a country belonging to the type of a Post-
Communist former Soviet state will be more likely to discern too large income 
differences in their countries. By contrast, residents of a Post-Communist 
East European state as well as East Germans will be less likely to perceive 
too large income differences.
It is evident that the classification of countries in terms of income inequality 
and type of welfare regime overlaps to a considerable degree (see also Fenger, 
2007). In the empirical analysis we will test the two determinants separately 
and thus we will, at least in part, be able to distinguish between the two effects. 
The socio-structural position of an individual is a determinant for beliefs 
about a just distribution of income and wealth in a society. Accordingly, an 
individual’s personal economic situation and self-evaluation of the social 
position might also affect beliefs about how the state should be involved in 
redistribution. Verwiebe & Wegener (2000: 145) point out that the causal 
relevance of the structural position increased together with the extent to 
which a CEE society has converged to Western European societies. They 
also argue that the impact of cultural (or primary) values has declined; that 
is, the “old” equality ideology of socialism has lost ground. Considering the 
three aforementioned major equality ideologies, we suggest that the special 
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situation of the transforming CEE societies has led to the prevalence of 
the ideologies of egalitarianism and functionalism (see also Verwiebe & 
Wegener, 2000: 134). This leads to our third hypothesis:
HYPOTHESIS 3: An individual’s idea of the state’s role in redistribution 
is a function of its own socioeconomic position in a society. People in higher 
and privileged positions cling to the functionalist ideology, those in lower and 
deprived positions to the egalitarian ideology.
Örkény and Székelyi (2000: 201) suggested ti investigate a population’s 
perception of the distribution system as a separate dimension in comparative 
research on social inequality. In our view, the image of a functioning 
redistribution system is related to the notion of diverging types of society in 
terms of stratification. In the ISSP survey of 2009, five different stratification 
systems or types of societies were presented to the respondents (see Figure 
5): An elite-mass model, a pyramid model, an alleviated pyramid, a diamond-
model or middle-class dominated society, and an inverted alleviated pyramid 
(a society in which upper middle classes dominate). Respondents were asked 
two questions in regard to these models: First, what they thought their society 
actually looked like, and, second, which type of society they would prefer. 
We assume that both the existing income distribution and the institutions 
of social protection and welfare provision – as described in the motivation 
for our second hypothesis – have an impact on perceptions of the societal 
stratification system. Thus, the fourth hypothesis is: 
HYPOTHESIS 4: An individual’s perception of a particular type of stratified 
society depends on his/her membership in a particular welfare regime. Thus, 
people in Post-Soviet countries and people in countries with high economic 
inequality will see the stratification of their society more as an elite-mass 
model, but will prefer the inverted pyramid model. People in Central East 
European countries will perceive their societies mostly as a pyramid, and 
would prefer a middle-class model.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The following analysis is based on the ISSP module Social Inequality from 
2009 (ISSP Research Group, 2012). The original sample consists of 53155 
respondents from forty-four countries. Our analysis is carried out on the basis 
of a sample of 14031 individuals from twelve CEE countries. The three main 
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dependent variables (DV) are the perception of too large income differences, 
the support of income redistribution by the state, which are both described 
below, and the view of the societal stratification type, as described before. 
The research questions also require additional typologies and data as system 
features or macro-social indicators (e.g. Gini coefficients and change ratios, 
welfare-regime types). Our original intention was to conduct multilevel 
regression. According to the literature, the number of countries in our 
research design is suitable for multilevel modelling (Hadler, 2004; Snijders 
& Bosker, 2011). This method allows for the nesting of data, which means 
that the number of individuals within a country is taken into account. Further, 
the effects and standard errors of macro variables (e.g. Gini index, welfare 
regime) are estimated on the basis of the number of macro units (i.e. the 
countries) instead of the total sample size. In this way, multilevel regression 
provides reliable results (Hadler, 2004, 2005). However, the first stage of our 
multilevel model was computed and the indicators produced fell short of the 
critical threshold values. The most important indicator in this regard is the 
intraclass correlation coefficient. It is recommended that its calculation ought 
to result in a value between 0.10 and 0.25 (Snijders & Bosker, 2011: 18), but 
the values of our model vary between 0.03 and 0.05. This means that between 
three and five per cent of the overall variance can be explained by the macro 
context, which is not sufficient for the proper use of multilevel regression. 
The alternative approach is linear regression and the use of binary-coded 
dummy variables that represent the country units (Hadler, 2004: 54). 
In order to test Hypothesis 1 to 3, two major linear regressions were 
computed with SPSS. A logistic regression was calculated for Hypothesis 4. 
The dependent variables (DV), independent variables (IV), control variables 
(CV) as well as the coding of all included variables are presented in Table 3. 
All IV and CV were checked for multicollinearity (see also VIF and tolerance 
values in the linear regression tables). Each of the regressions is expanded by 
a second model that considers potential effects of an individual’s membership 
in a particular Post-Socialist country by means of country-dummy variables. 
This additional regression allows identification of the effects of the country 
level while taking socio-structural control variables into account.
18 FELIX RIEDL–MAX HALLER
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The foci of our paper are the increase and shape of objective inequality 
across the CEE countries and their impact on the subjective perceptions of 
inequality. The ISSP survey provides an item that directly addresses this issue 
which is formulated as follows: “The differences in income are too large” 
(GESIS, 2008). Respondents can indicate whether they agree or disagree 
by means of a Likert scale, whereby full consent is coded as 1 and non-
consent is coded as 5. Figure 3 depicts the aggregate relationship between 
the CEE countries’ Gini values of 2009 and the mean values of the individual 
perceptions of income inequality. Additionally, Figure 4 shows the ratio of 
the change in income inequality between 1989 and 2009 and the mean values 
of the inequality perception. Hypothesis 1 claims that the levels of objective 
inequality are related to the subjective perception of too large differences in 
income.
Figure 3 CEE Gini-index values 2009 in comparison with mean values 
of income-inequality perception
Sources: See Figure 2; Mean values of perception from ISSP – Social Inequality 2009
 34
Figure 3: CEE Gini-index values 2009 in comparison with mean values of income-inequality 
perception 
Sources: See Figure 2; Mean values of perception from ISSP – Social Inequality 2009 
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Figure 4 CEE Gini-change ratio 2009 to 1989 in comparison with mean values of 
income-inequality perception
At first glance, the scatterplots do not appear to be in favor of Hypothesis 1; 
there is no clear pattern that indicates a linear relationship between the level of 
objective inequality and its subjective perception. Figure 3 shows that the Post-
Soviet countries – first of all Russia itself – are the most unequal; the perception 
of the population, however, is only at an intermediate level. This dimension 
varies strongly. However, between the more Western countries, Hungary has 
the lowest mean value while the Czech Republic has the highest. The lower the 
mean value, the stronger is the perception of large income differences. Maybe 
this reflects the fact that state socialism was more liberal in Hungary, permitting 
a considerable proportion of private entrepreneurship (“Goulash Communism”) 
while the Communists were very strong in former Czechoslovakia in the first 
elections after World War II5 and established soon a state-socialist system (see 
also Večerník, 2009). Likewise, Figure 4 does not indicate a linear relationship 
between the change in economic inequality (1989-2009) and the perception 
of it. Regression analysis provides us with a clearer message here; its major 
advantage is the possibility to include several independent and control variables 
at the same time in one. This makes it possible to avoid an overestimation or 
underestimation of the key determinants. We assume that attitudes and behavior 
are influenced also by the socio-structural position of an individual, and hence it 
is important to consider the respective control variables.
5 The Communists gained 38 % of the votes in the elections of 1946.
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Figure 4: CEE Gini-change ratio 2009 to 1989 in comparison with mean values of income-
inequality perception 
Sources: See Figure 2 and 3
Figure 5: ISSP Society types
Source: GESIS (2008: 13) 
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Table 4 Linear regression analysis of the perception of too large income differences
Model 1: Inequality and Welfare Regimes B Sig. SE Beta Tolerance VIF
Constant 1,137 0,068
System Characteristics
GINI 2009 -0,001 0,003 -0,006 0,696 1,437
GINI Change-Ratio 2009 to 1989 0,132 ** 0,039 0,042 0,713 1,402
Post-Communist East European states (Ref)
Post-Communist former Soviet states -0,147 ** 0,021 -0,101 0,534 1,873
Post-Communist German state -0,109 ** 0,039 -0,031 0,906 1,104
Individual Characteristics
Social class self-assessed 0,073 ** 0,008 0,113 0,748 1,337
Income 0,022 ** 0,008 0,031 0,81 1,234
Education 0,012 0,007 0,022 0,633 1,58
Age -0,001 * 0 -0,023 0,934 1,071
Gender -0,01 0,016 -0,007 0,929 1,077
Model 2: Country Effects       
Constant 1,061 0,048
Countries (Ref = Ukraine)
Bulgaria 0,276 ** 0,034 0,099 0,739 1,353
Croatia 0,216 ** 0,033 0,088 0,617 1,619
Czech Republic 0,392 ** 0,031 0,168 0,609 1,643
East Germany 0,13 ** 0,042 0,037 0,761 1,315
Estonia 0,157 ** 0,039 0,048 0,776 1,289
Hungary 0,032 0,032 0,013 0,629 1,59
Latvia 0,221 ** 0,032 0,088 0,674 1,483
Poland 0,383 ** 0,035 0,136 0,707 1,414
Russia 0,17 ** 0,034 0,063 0,699 1,431
Slovakia 0,186 ** 0,03 0,083 0,6 1,666
Slovenia 0,166 ** 0,033 0,064 0,657 1,523
Individual Characteristics
Social class self-assessed 0,063 ** 0,008 0,098 0,696 1,437
Income 0,027 ** 0,008 0,039 0,805 1,243
Education 0,013 0,007 0,023 0,613 1,631
Age 0 0 -0,011 0,894 1,118
Gender -0,001  0,015 -0,001 0,925 1,081
R2 Model 1: 0,029**
R2 Model 2: 0,052**
N=8700
Significance: ** p ≤ 0.01 * p ≤ 0.05
Data: See Table 3
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According to Table 4, the impact of the level of objective inequality is weak 
in comparison with an individual’s own class background. Being a member 
of a higher socioeconomic class (according to one’s own self-assessment) 
corresponds with a stronger rejection of the belief that inequality is too high, 
the dependent variable (DV). Also personal income has a significant effect on 
this belief or perception, albeit its Beta value is at a much lower level. In other 
words, people who are better off less frequently think that income differences 
in their country are too large. Interestingly, the impact of the level of income 
inequality in 2009 is statistically insignificant while the change ratio between 
1989 and 2009 is significant and has the third highest Beta value. It indicates, 
however, a positive correlation with the DV. Thus, the data contradict the 
assumption of Hypothesis 1: They suggest that individuals from a country 
with increasing inequality do not tend to have the impression of too large 
income differences in their country.
The regression model indicates, however, strong support for Hypothesis 
2. Controlling for the impact of the individual social position, the effect of 
membership in one of the CEE welfare regimes is statistically significant 
and strong (Model 1 in Table 4). The dummies for the Post-Communist 
former Soviet state and Post-Communist German state are both statistically 
significant and negatively correlated with the DV, whereas the former has 
a much higher Beta value than the latter. Individuals who live in a country 
within those distinct welfare regimes are coded as 1. This means that they 
indeed tend to share the belief that large differences in income exist in their 
countries. It also supports Hypothesis 2 by showing that people within the 
former Soviet Union have a stronger tendency to perceive large differences 
in income. It can be argued that people within the Post-Communist East 
European states do not tend to claim that large income differences exist, since 
they are coded as 0. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is supported across all CEE 
countries. Model 2 in Table 4 reveals the country-level effect on the DV. Here 
we can see that particularly people in the Czech Republic and Poland exhibit 
the strongest tendency to reject the idea of large income differences in their 
countries.
Hypothesis 3 can be tested with the regression model presented in Table 
5. The hypothesis claims a strong relationship between an individual’s 
socioeconomic position and his or her attitude toward redistribution by 
the welfare state. The DV is formulated in the following way: “It is the 
responsibility of the government to reduce differences in income”. Here, too, 
the respondents can state their consent or non-consent on a Likert scale, with 
full consent coded as 1 and rejection coded as 5. 
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Table 5: Linear regression analysis of the attitude toward the reduction of income 
differences
Model 1: Inequality and Welfare Regimes B Sig. SE Beta Tolerance VIF
Constant 1,274 0,091
System Characteristics
GINI 2009 0,007 0,004 0,023 0,699 1,431
GINI Change-Ratio 2009 to 1989 0,225 ** 0,053 0,053 0,71 1,408
Post-Communist East European states (Ref)
Post-Communist former Soviet states -0,35 ** 0,028 -0,177 0,532 1,878
Post-Communist German state 0,051 0,052 0,011 0,907 1,103
Individual Characteristics
Social class self-assessed 0,103 ** 0,011 0,117 0,746 1,34
Income 0,099 ** 0,011 0,105 0,812 1,232
Education 0,063 ** 0,01 0,085 0,632 1,582
Age -0,003 ** 0,001 -0,046 0,936 1,069
Gender -0,035 0,021 -0,018 0,93 1,076
Model 2: Country Effects
Constant 1,121 0,063
Countries (Ref = Ukraine)
Bulgaria 0,442 ** 0,045 0,114 0,743 1,345
Croatia 0,229 ** 0,043 0,068 0,617 1,621
Czech Republic 0,821 ** 0,041 0,259 0,608 1,645
East Germany 0,543 ** 0,055 0,114 0,761 1,314
Estonia 0,548 ** 0,051 0,124 0,774 1,292
Hungary 0,272 ** 0,042 0,084 0,626 1,598
Latvia 0,293 ** 0,042 0,086 0,673 1,486
Poland 0,595 ** 0,046 0,156 0,706 1,416
Russia 0,102 * 0,044 0,028 0,697 1,435
Slovakia 0,534 ** 0,04 0,176 0,6 1,666
Slovenia 0,194 ** 0,044 0,055 0,655 1,528
Individual Characteristics
Social class self-assessed 0,087 ** 0,011 0,099 0,696 1,438
Income 0,103 ** 0,011 0,109 0,805 1,242
Education 0,066 ** 0,01 0,089 0,614 1,63
Age -0,002 ** 0,001 -0,032 0,897 1,115
Gender -0,036  0,02 -0,019 0,926 1,08
R2 Model 1: 0,076**
R2 Model 2: 0,12**
N=8581
Significance: ** p ≤ 0.01 * p ≤ 0.05
Data: See Table 3
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Interestingly, the former Soviet states dummy exhibits the highest Beta 
value and a negative effect on the DV; thus, people within this welfare regime 
strongly tend to support redistribution policy. However, we are also interested 
in the effect of individual socioeconomic characteristics on the DV. Here, an 
individual’s socioeconomic class background turns out to have the highest 
impact, followed by levels of income and education. All of these IV are 
positively correlated with the DV, which implies that a higher socioeconomic 
position corresponds with the rejection of a redistributive policy. Model 2 in 
Table 5 takes the country effects into account and indicates that the effect of 
the membership in at least five countries is stronger than that of the individual 
socioeconomic position – four of them are associated with the Post-Communist 
East European states (the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria). The 
positive Beta coefficient suggests that individuals from these countries tend to 
reject redistribution policy. In general, Hypothesis 3 is supported by the data. 
Particularly the first model displays significant effects of the socioeconomic 
position on the DV. Concerning Hypotheses 1 to 3, each of the regressions 
suggests that also macro characteristics (that is, objective inequality and the 
membership in a welfare regime or a particular country) have considerable 
effects on people’s beliefs and perceptions about social inequality. We must 
note, however, that our regressions consider only individuals who have their 
own income. Concerning the two socio-demographic characteristics, gender 
has no significant impact in any of the regression models while age has a 
slight impact on and is negatively correlated with both DV. This means that 
older people tend to perceive larger income differences, and that they are 
more in favor of redistribution policy. This is plausible in view of the fact 
that they were socialized during the Communist period and many of them, 
now in their old age, will have experienced a deterioration in their standards 
of living.
The ISSP questionnaire includes two items that address typical images of 
stratified societies. Hypothesis 4 claims that an individual’s self-attribution to 
a distinct type of stratified society is contingent upon his or her membership 
in a particular welfare regime. One item asks for the individual perception 
and assessment of the type of society an individual lives in, another one is 
about an individual’s desire for a particular type. Figure 5 gives an overview 
of these images. Their step-like structure suggests a pattern of stratification, 
going from the bottom to the top, where every step equals a social stratum. 
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Figure 5 ISSP Society types
Before testing Hypothesis 4, let us investigate the distribution of relative 
frequencies across the CEE countries as well as across the three welfare 
regimes on both items; i.e. the preference and the desire for a particular society 
type. The cross tabulation in Table 6 lists each type by its most salient features 
in the upper half, whereas types D and E (see Figure 5) were aggregated to 
one single type (“broad middle and upper class”). As a next step, we recoded 
both variables to dichotomous dummies that distinguish between asymmetric 
(types A, B, C, coded as 0) and symmetric types of stratification (types D, E, 
coded as 1). 
The key significance test (Pearson-Chi-Square) rejects for both items the 
null hypothesis, which claims that the welfare-regime types and the society 
types are not associated. This result further supports Hypothesis 4 since it 
implies a significant relationship between welfare regimes and the perception 
of the societal pattern of stratification. The right-hand side of Table 6 shows 
that most individuals in the Post-Communist former Soviet states (54 %) 
claim to live in a society with “a small elite at the top, very few people in 
the middle and the great mass of people at the bottom”. A similar pattern is 
indicated for the Post-Communist East European states (45 %), while a third 
(33 %) within this welfare regime associate their society with “a pyramid with 
a small elite at the top, more people in the middle, and most at the bottom”. The 
relative majority of East Germans are associated with this “distinct pyramid-
type” (39 %), and about a fifth of them with the “elite vs. mass-type” (22 %) 
and the “weak pyramid-type” (19 %). Across all regimes, only a minority 
selects society types that indicate more equality, including a broader middle 
and upper class, except East Germans, who refer more often to such types. 
Aggregating the society types into a binary coded variable clearly shows 
the differences between the regimes, with East Germans having the lowest 
share (80 %) of respondents that consider their society asymmetric. Bulgaria 
and Ukraine show the highest proportions (96 %) of asymmetric types; also 
Croatia, Hungary, Latvia and Slovakia have very high shares – each with 
 35
Figure 4: CEE Gini-change ratio 2009 to 1989 in comparison with mean values of income-
inequality perception 
Sources: See Figure 2 and 3
Figure 5: ISSP Society types
Source: GESIS (2008: 13) 
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more than 90 % – of people who consider their society to be stratified in this 
way.
To get a more comprehensive picture it is also of interest to analyze which 
type of society people in CEE consider desirable. The lower section of Table 
6 shows the resulting figures. Here, too, the significance test confirms that 
welfare regime and the desire for a particular type of society are associated. 
However, the pattern obviously differs from what is suggested in the upper 
section of this table. Logically, a person who thinks of herself as living in an 
unjust society would most likely prefer to live in a fair society. It is exactly 
this inference that can be drawn from the results. The data indicate a reverse 
pattern, thus desire is diametrically opposed to perception. Across all welfare 
regimes and countries, the “broad middle and upper class-type” is the most 
desired, particularly so in the former Soviet states (82 %). Latvia (91 %) and 
Ukraine (87 %) show the highest proportions, followed by the East European 
Post-Communist states (76 %). Within this welfare regime, Croatia (87 %) 
and Bulgaria (82 %) have the highest share regarding desire for a symmetrical 
society. East Germany comes in last, with a proportion of 67 %.
Finally, Hypothesis 4 can be tested with a logistic regression, wherein we 
apply the same approach to our analysis as demonstrated with the previous 
regressions (i.e. two models with the identical IV and CV). The results are 
presented in Table 7. They support our fourth hypothesis to the extent that 
the membership in one of the welfare regimes has a stronger effect on the 
DV than the individual CV (e.g. social class, education). However, objective 
inequality (Gini 2009 and the change ratio) has no significant effect.
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Table 7 Logistic regression analysis of the perceived type of society, 2-type model
Model 1: Inequality and Welfare Regimes B Sig. SE Exp(B)
Constant -2,114 0,397 8,264
System Characteristics
GINI 2009 -0,005 0,016 1,005
GINI Change-Ratio 2009 to 1989 0,189 0,206 1,208
Post-Communist East European states -0,763 ** 0,154 2,146
Post-Communist former Soviet states -1,233 ** 0,164 3,436
Post-Communist German state (Ref)
Individual Characteristics
Social class self-assessed 0,295 ** 0,042 1,343
Income -0,039 0,043 1,040
Education -0,102 ** 0,038 1,107
Age -0,004 0,002 1,004
Gender -0,002 0,081 1,002
Model 2: Country Effects
Constant -3,315 0,243 27,778
Countries (Ref = Hungary)
Bulgaria -0,503 0,296 1,653
Croatia 0,127 0,22 1,136
Czech Republic 1,01 ** 0,187 2,746
East Germany 1,385 ** 0,21 3,996
Estonia 0,568 * 0,235 1,765
Latvia 0,09 0,223 1,094
Poland 1,246 ** 0,198 3,477
Russia 0,737 ** 0,213 2,090
Slovakia 0,423 * 0,199 1,527
Slovenia 1,095 ** 0,195 2,989
Ukraine -0,503 * 0,235 1,653
Individual Characteristics
Social class self-assessed 0,232 ** 0,044 1,261
Income -0,011 0,043 1,011
Education -0,085 * 0,039 1,088
Age 0 0,003 1,000
Gender 0,045  0,082 1,046
Cox & Snell R2 Model 1: 0,016**
Nagelkerke R2 Model 1: 0,035**
Cox & Snell R2 Model 2: 0,035**
Nagelkerke R2 Model 2: 0,076**
N=8213; Significance: ** p ≤ 0.01 * p ≤ 0.05
Data: See Table 3
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Individuals from the former Soviet states welfare regime are about 3.4 
times and those from the other East European states about 2.1 times more 
likely to identify their societal stratification system as asymmetrical as the 
B value indicates a negative effect on the DV. Model 2 reveals that being an 
East German is positively correlated with the DV and has the strongest effect. 
East Germans are almost four times more likely to refer to a symmetrical type 
of society, which stands in plain contrast to the other welfare regimes where 
people obviously perceive much more marked inequality. The lower half of 
the table also shows that the Czechs, Poles and Slovenes see their society as 
stratified more symmetrically.
CONCLUSION
The relationship between macro-social patterns of stratification and 
inequality and their perception and evaluation by members of a society has 
been a central issue of sociology since Alexis de Tocqueville’s work on 
democracy and equality in America (see Tocqueville, 1981). The experience 
of the East European countries serves as a paradigmatic empirical case in 
this respect for several reasons. First, the decades-long social and political 
order of communism – a macro-experiment par excellence (Lenski, 1978) – 
was formally abolished within a remarkably short time span and substituted 
by the economic principles of capitalism and Western democracy. This 
transformation involved far-reaching changes in the economic, social 
and political spheres. Second, Communism and Western capitalism and 
democracy are also competing ideologies and thus will have direct effects 
on individual perceptions and evaluations of inequality and equality. The 
revolutionary political turnaround was caused by the adverse experiences 
of the CEE countries’ peoples with the oppressive character of Communist 
politics as well as its inability to keep pace with the rise of living standards in 
Western Europe. Critical scholars claim that the turbulent years of political 
and economic reforms were characterized by a neglect of redistributive 
mechanisms and a social policy necessary to attenuate the newly rising 
inequalities. Unemployment and poverty became salient and massive new 
social problems for most of the CEE societies. It could be argued that the 
failure to recognize the importance of welfare-state institutions was due to the 
absolute rejection of the state-socialist past and this explains why neoliberal 
reform approaches were welcomed euphorically and unquestioned by the 
national policy makers in charge and their international (mostly US-) advisers. 
Third, a large quantity of socioeconomic data is now available to assess 
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economic performance during and after the transition, as well as changing 
levels of income inequality in the CEE countries. Comparison across time 
suggests that two decades ago inequality in CEE was at a much lower level than 
it is today. A key inference from our empirical findings, however, is that the 
mere level of objective inequality as measured by means of Gini coefficients 
is not positively correlated in a strong way with the subjective perception of 
too large income differences. An explanation for this surprising phenomenon 
may be that the perception of the unequal distribution of resources is mediated 
by socio-cultural and political institutions, in particular the mass media and 
public debates. It is well known, for instance, that the freedom of press to 
report about social problems – and these may include questions about income 
distribution – is restricted in Russia. Interestingly, earlier cross-sectional 
research beyond CEE also indicates low correlation between objective 
inequality and its individual perception. Further, this research shows evidence 
that in countries with higher economic prosperity (measured with the GDP 
per capita) people are less likely to perceive large income differences (Hadler, 
2005; see also Kerr, 2011). The level of income inequality and economic 
prosperity can be a welfare-state characteristic inter alia, as demonstrated by 
Fenger (2007: 19, 23). Our findings show that the individuals’ embeddedness 
in a particular welfare regime matters significantly. As opposed to the one-
dimensional variable income inequality, the concept of a welfare regime 
combines several dimensions of socioeconomic and political macro features 
that result in a distinct institutional structure. It also may include the different 
religious composition of the CEE countries. Therefore, future cross-sectional 
studies on CEE should also pay attention to the fact that most Post-Soviet 
societies are orthodox while the more Western CEE countries are catholic, 
and some of them (e.g. Czech Republic, Hungary) have sizable protestant 
minorities. Furthermore, the differences between the welfare regimes can be 
comprehended better through their connection to perceived images of societal 
stratification. Most individuals in the Post-Communist former Soviet states 
associate their societies with a model that indicates a very small elite at the top 
and most people at the bottom. Maybe many people think that there should be 
more differentiation within the bottom strata. On the other side, the majority of 
the respondents from the CEE countries desire a society with a broad middle 
and upper class. Therefore, it can be concluded that particularly people in 
Russia, the Ukraine and the Baltics might feel socially disadvantaged. Such 
a finding is indeed worrying and policy makers would be well advised to 
counteract such sources of potential political instability, national chauvinism 
and social unrest. The main finding concerning the more Western CEE 
countries is that the significant economic growth and rise of living standards 
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in the region has attenuated the problem of economic inequality. However, 
they also face many new social problems and the CEE countries in general 
would be well advised to take seriously the quest of their citizens for a more 
balanced distribution of opportunities and life chances. A prerequisite for 
this will be the development of well-organized and functioning institutions 
of industrial and political representation of interests (e.g. unions, political 
parties) and that the elite-led process of transition (Haller, 1996) is substituted 
by true and transparent democratic systems.
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